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Evolving Due Process and the French Institutionalists:
Reflections on the Right to Counsel and the Adamson Dis-
sent
ALBERT BRODERICK, O.P.*
CAN THERE BE objective constitutional analysis? Or does broad constitutional
choice, as in due process cases, inevitably rest upon the subjective values of
each judge? Vigorous controversy on this point has stirred the Supreme Court
itself, as well as its commentators.
The Supreme Court may justify apparent constitutional "change" as cor-
rection of long standing error, as if the original intent of the constitutional
draftsmen was only now correctly perceived.1 The historicity of the Court
"better informed" has sometimes been viewed as dubious, to use a gentle
word.2 Commentators may renounce the possibility of objective decision, and
attribute constitutional change to the different subjective attitude of a newer
judge, as in the apparent shift in the Court's position on the scope of legisla-
tive investigation after the appointment of Mr. Justice Goldberg.
1
LL.B., S.J.D. (Harvard), Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1
Wesberry v. Sanders, 375 U.S. - (1964). Compare the historical appraisal of Justice Black
upon which basis the Court asserts for the first time a supervisory role for itself in equalizing
districts for congressional elections; cf. the contradictory historical appraisal of Justice Har-
lan in dissent; cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) where the Court reversed
the century-old interpretation in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) as an unconstitu-
tional assertion of power by the federal courts. See Judge Friendly's recent salutation, In
Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law. 19 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964).
2 See Justice Harlan's dissent in Wesberry, supra note 1. That such debate over ancient his-
tory may be irrelevant, or at least not of prime importance, is suggested by Judge Friendly,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 70. ".. . The constitutional ground of Erie must be appraised in the
light of the Constitution as it had come to be known by 1938." The notion of development
in constitutional doctrine is at least as old as Hurtado v. California, 110 US. 516 (1884).
1 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963). See Dembitz,
The Supreme Court's New Look at Investigations of Subversion, 18 RECORD Or N.Y.C.B.A.
574 (1963).
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The "classic debate"4 on the court has abated, but the stillness may portend
a drastic restrictive reformulation of due process.5 The sharp exchange in the
literature on "neutral principles" has subsided,6 but no working consensus has
emerged. If we seek a method of objective constitutional analysis, at once prin-
cipled and purposeful, perhaps it is time to consider a legal way familiar
neither to our judges nor to our craft literature:7 the dynamic institutional ap-
proach that Hauriou, Renard and Delos advanced in France.8
We set this preliminary study of the judicial method of the French Institu-
tionalists in the concrete context of the recent developments in the Court con-
cerning the right to assistance of counsel in state criminal cases, and of general
due process formulation as reflected in renewed interest in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Black in Adamson v. California.9
The Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright'° closed the central dialogue
on the right to counsel in state criminal cases by holding it absolute. But how
the Court reached this result furnishes unusual pathology, and opens up fur-
ther questions: Is the Court on the verge of repudiating other decisions on
the content of due process?"1 If so, how will it rationalize such changes? Will
4 The phrase is Mr. Justice Brennan's, in Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275
(1960).
'The Justices themselves have taken to the legal literature on some key themes. See Bren-
nan, The Bill of Rights and the States (James Madison Lecture at the New York University
School of Law), 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 761 (1961), Clark, The Sixth Amendment and the Law of
the Land, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1963), and Warren, Science and the Law: Change and the
Constitution, 12 J. PUB. L. 3 (1963).
' The chief contributions were Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959), and Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality
in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHi. L. REV. 661 (1960). There are, however, two re-
cent postscripts to this dialogue: Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Ap-
proach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 (1963), and
Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living Constitution," 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 881 (1963).
'But see Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, 31 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1918). A translation of selections of the writings of Hauriou, Renard and Delos, and some
commentaries on their work, is in process of preparation for publication by the Harvard
University Press in its Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series, under the auspices of
the Association of American Law Schools. See Broderick, Sur une nouvelle edition des institu-
tionnalistes francais, 8 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE Du DROIT 277 (1963).
' A Rockefeller Foundation grant, in legal and political philosophy made it possible for the
author to study these jurists in France in 1962-1963.
'332 U.S. 46 (1947). This dissent, in which Justices Douglas, and Murphy and Rutledge
(in part), concurred, urged that the effect of the 14th Amendment had been to incorporate
in itself the first eight Amendments. See Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963), and the following colloquy in the Court on the argument
of Malloy v. Hogan, No. 110, on March 5, 1964, reported in 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3310:
Mr. Justice Black: "You want us to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment does incor-
porate the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights."
[Counsel for petitioner] : "Only to the extent necessary to decide this case. I am not
willing to be a pioneer beyond reasonable distances."
10372 U.S. 335 (1963).
a In the Malloy case, supra note 9, petitioner asks that the Court overrule Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), where the Court refused to find that the 5th Amendment privilege
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it now adopt the much rejected suggestion in the Adamson dissent that the
14th Amendment "incorporated" the first eight amendments, making them
applicable to state action? How would the Court deal with these questions if
it used the French Institutional approach? First, the ingredients of this ap-
proach must be briefly set out.
I
THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH: THEORY
It is the distinctive dynamiC1 2 approach of the French Institutionalist jurists,
Hauriou,13 Renard14 and Delos, t5 that we emphasize here.' 6 The leader of the
French school, Maurice Hauriou, was Dean of the Facult6 de Droit of Tou-
louse in the first quarter of the century,' 7 as well as the acknowledged dean of
French jurists writing on droit administratif.'8 Georges Renard during most
of his career was professor of public law at Nancy,1 9 where Francois Geny20
against self-incrimination was made applicable to the states by the 14th. On the argument in
Malloy Justice Brennan stated that at least four justices were prepared to reverse Twining on
this ground. See 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3309. The case was sub judice When this article went to
press. See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L. J.
74 (1963).
"The contrast is with the concept of institutions as a stationary, ponderous force in soci-
ety, made popular by Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, and Walton Hamilton, In-
stitution, in the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.
" Hauriou's chief works are LA SCIENCE SOCIALE TRADITIONNELLE, 1896, twelve editions of
LES PRINcHPEs DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, two editions of LES PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC, and
two editions of PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, the second of which (in 1929) was his
last work. In addition Hauriou published three volumes of his notes on decisions of the
Conseil d'Etat from 1892 to 1929, and many monographs, the most celebrated of which was
La theorie de t'institution et de la fondation, 4 CAHIERS DE LA NOUVELLE JOURNEE 10 (1925).
" Renard's leading volume is LA THEORIE DE LINSTITUTION, 1930. His many other works
include LA PHILOSOPHIE DE L'INSTITUTION, 1939, a sequel to the other institutional volume,
and his three volume series, INTRODUCTION PHILOSOPHIQUE A L'ETUDE Du DROIT (embracing
LE DROIT, LA JUSTICE, ET LA VOLONTE, 1923-24; LE DROIT, LA LOc.IQUE ET LE BON SENS, 1925-
26; LE DROrr, L'ORDRE ET LA RAISON, 1925-27). These volumes are unavailable for purchase
even in France. They have been translated into Spanish; their translation into English would
greatly expand our contact with French legal philosophy.
IDelos' chief works are LA SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE ET LES PRINCIPEs Du DROIT PUBLIC,
(1929), with a second edition in 1950 (a volume also much in need of an English transla-
tion) , and La theorie de l'institution, L'ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE Du DROIT 97 (1931).
I" Hart and Sacks, MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROCESS, (mimeographed ed., 1958) is another
dynamic, purpose-oriented study that emphasizes the significance of institutional elements
in society. The materials are expected to appear in book form, published by Foundation
Press, in 1965.
'1 Almost until his death in 1929.
"Hauriou's renown as a commentator on the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat, the high
court of French droit administratif has been memorialized of late. See Fournier, Maurice
Hauriou, Arretiste, 11 ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS, 155 (1957), and Arrighi, Hauriou: un corn-
moentateur des arrdts du Conseil d'Etat, LIvE JUBILAIRE DU CONSEIL D'ETAT, pp. 341 ff., (1952).
"1 See Jennings, The Institutional Theory, in MODERN THEORIES OF LAW, Jennings, ed., pp.
68-85, (1933).
2Gny's chief works METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF, (1899),
and SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF, (1913-1924) were made known to American
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was dean. Joseph T. Delos, long professor of sociology and of law at Lille, and
the only one of the three still alive, is now a professor at the Angelicum
University in Rome.
Their thought is much too precise and complex, and too diverse at points,
to attempt more here than a selection of a few leading themes that character-
ize their approach to public law. Their basic orientation is sociological, but
their constant quest is for a balance between the extremes of Kelsen (formal-
ism) and of Duguit (pure "materialism" or "sociologism"). 21 They conceive
justice as the concern of positive law, but urge that the practical concrete an-
swers as to what is just are found in the "social facts"; and man himself, in his
natural sociability, is the principal "social fact".
In their view, these social facts tend to structure themselves into institu-
tions22 under the direction of "ideas of the group" that are continually de-
veloping and renewing themselves. For in the social facts the jurist must rec-
ognize the primacy of the rational element, the role played by the "idea,"
which moves the individuals in the way of the institution and which is the
vital thing in organized groups. 23 The role of authority is to organize, pursue
and elaborate the "idea", but before acting in this way it must "observe", or
extract from the social facts, the idea in its present stage of development; and
this is the role of sociology. The social facts are not themselves normative, for
this role belongs to the "idea", the rational element, and this in turn must be
viewed in the light of a few basic critical principles furnished by moral and
social philosophy. The excellence of a society will ultimately depend upon the
quality of these principles. Hauriou believes that observation of the develop-
ment of civilized society confirms that such principles include the values of
social order, justice and liberty, and recognition of the need to balance power
readers by Judge Cardozo's THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 1921, in which G4ny was
cited more than any other single author. See Wortley, Franfois Geny, in MODERN THEORIES
OF LAW, op. cit. supra note 19, at pp. 139-159.
31 Hauriou's comments on Kelsen may be found in the Preface to his PRECIS DU DROIT CON-
STITUTIONNEL, (2d ed., 1929), and on Duguit in his classic essay, La thiorie de 'institution et
de la fondation, op. cit. supra note 13, and in almost every one of his general textual works.
I Hauriou pointed out that "institution" is taken in two different senses in the common
use of the word. The first, in which he was almost exclusively interested, in the sense of or-
ganized groups; he called these "institution-persons" that enjoyed independent existence.
The second was in the sense of an objective social factor of standing and acceptance that in-
hered in some person or group; these he called "institution-things", and he identified the
most characteristic example of what he had in mind, the legal rule.
I The definition that Hauriou gave to "institution" is widely cited:
...An institution is an idea of a work or enterprise that is realized and that endures
juridically in a social milieu; for the realization of this idea a power is organized that
equips it with organs; and among the members of the social group interested in the
idea manifestations of communion occur that are directed by the organs of the power
and regulated by procedures.
Hauriou, La thdorie de l'institution et de la fondation, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 10. Note
that the "institution" is not a mystical personified entity, but the "idea" itself, in which the
members share ("communion').
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with power in view of the history of human weakness here, in Lord Acton's
sense.
24
Four basic elements may be singled out for the purpose of relating the
thought of Hauriou, Renard and Delos to our constitutional law. (1) This
institutional approach is purposeful, intent upon achieving human group
aims; but these elaborated purposes, or "ideas", are not static, but rather in
dynamic process of development. 25 Any conscious redirection must commence
from realistic evaluation of the contemporary situation: not only the prac-
tice in a society, but also its basic "ideas". For these "ideas" frequently are
loftier than the practice. (2) The juridical rule is no mere formal deduction,
nor a subjective end product of a judge; the rule and social reality are in-
timately interrelated; in fact, priority in time belongs to the social reality from
which the rule proceeds. Delos makes this point clearly:
An important change has been introduced into the study of the juridical rule.
It has ceased to be studied independent of its social matter, as if the juridical
form was the whole of the rule of law, its very essence.. . . The rule of law has
become again in the eyes of jurists what it is in fact: a social form . . . taking
positive juridical form.26
(3) Law is an art of achieving accepted social objectives.27 Yet it operates un-
der certain scientific conditions. There is urgent need properly to understand
the true objects and functions of law, politics, economics, sociology, psycholo-
gy and the other social sciences. 28 The practical influence of one upon the
other is certain, but each has its distinct object and proper method. The jurist
must be aware of these distinctions and make use of these other social sciences
in his work. (4) At the peak of any social ordering are certain fundamental
moral presuppositions that eventually leave their mark on the final product.
Many of these, urge the Institutionalists, can be verified by close observation
of the reality of man living in society. Delos extends this notion to a revival of
objective natural law:
The return to reality extends to the study of natural law and justifies the revival
of favor it now rightly enjoys, although it has not entirely recovered from the dis-
credit into which it was plunged by an abstract and notional conception. Natural
law rests upon a consideration of human nature, and we are finally convinced, it
seems, that human nature is not first of all a notion or a concept but a reality.
214 "Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely."
I In Renard's phrase, the institution, that is, "the idea is only a theme to be developed."
Renard, LA THEORIE DE L'INSTITUTION, op. cit. supra note 14, at p. 235.
'"Delos, Le thdorie de l'institution, op. cit. supra note 15, at p. 150.
2 This basic notion that law is not primarily logical and deductive, but practical and pur-
poseful Hauriou takes from the classical legal tradition going back to Aristotle and the
Roman jurisconsults. Hauriou frequently cited Celsus who called law "Ars aequi et boni."
2 See Cairns' study of a generation ago that is still valuable, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
1935, passim, and Delos, L'objet de sociologie, LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE, May 10, 1930.
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It resides in each individual; it is what is most real and most living in each one,
the principle of all the instincts, vital forces, intellectual, moral or physical
needs, that give birth to the life of society and provide it with its ends.
29
Can this institutional approach help us to find a measure of objectivity in
constitutional development? The first consideration is what the Court has
been doing in due process interpretation; the second is whether the Institu-
tional approach would be useful in formulating objective working rules. Con-
cretely, this study begins by analyzing the development of the right to the as-
sistance of counsel in state criminal cases, down to its full-fledged recognition
in Gideon v. Wainwright.30 This case prompts consideration of the various
formulae used by the Court to ascertain the content of 14th Amendment
due process: those of the past; the prevailing Palko3a formula; and alter-
natives presently under consideration, such as the "total incorporation" doc-
trine of the A damson dissent, 2 and the "Brennan doctrine" 33 of "selective in-
corporation" of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights into the 14th Amend-
ment due process clause. Finally, comes the question whether the Institution-
al approach itself engenders a purposeful and objective interpretation of due
process.
II
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Twenty years is not a long life for a constitutional rule, but that life span of
Betts v. Brady34 was longer than many.3 5 The rule was conceived in violent
controversy, lived in unceasing combat and died of sheer exhaustion. Its life
history is worth poring over; but the autopsy of a constitutional rule is a pain-
ful process.
The 6th Amendment reads that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."86
Not until Powell v. Alabama3 7 did the Supreme Court agree that such a
"right" was protected against state action by the 14th Amendment. The in-
2 Delos, La thiorie de l'institution, op. cit., supra note 14, at p. 152.
- 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Many other areas might just as well have been selected; for instance
"equal protection" and education, the relation of the 4th and 5th Amendments and the de-
veloping national right of privacy.
8' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
, Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L. J. 74 (1963).
14 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
85 For instance, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) left to the states whether or not to
receive evidence that had been unconstitutionally seized, a rule that survived only 12 years-
until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
1 Cf. Freund, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT, 35, 1949: "It seems more nearly true
to regard that [6th] Amendment as having simply conferred the right of the accused to em.
ploy counsel-a right which of course was by no means assured prior to the adoption of the
Constitution."
-r287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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dications prior to Powell had looked the other way. For Hurtado v. Califor-
nia,38 in other respects strong on affirmative indications as to the content of
due process, had stated that rights specifically treated in other sections of the
Bill of Rights were not to be considered duplicated in the due process clause
of the 5th, or 14th. The Powell decision, (the Scottsboro case), disregarded
this criterion of Hurtado. Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,39 a non-capital
counterfeiting case, the Court held, for the first time, that the guarantee of
right to counsel in the federal courts applied to all cases, capital and non-
capital, and to all defendants, wealthy or indigent, as a very basis of jurisdic-
tion, apart from clear waiver.
A. The Saga of Betts v. Brady
The question whether an absolute right to counsel, as construed in the
Zerbst case, applied in a state non-capital case 40 was asked in Betts v. Brady.41
The Court's answer was "No." It provoked a strong reaction. 4
2
Betts was accused of robbery; he did not waive counsel, but pleaded not
guilty and examined witnesses. Maryland practice did not require counsel in
such cases and the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, found this
no basis for reversal:
Due process of law . . . formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than
those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an ap-
praisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting,
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations,
fall short of such denial.
43
- 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
-304 U.S. 458 (1938).
40 For Justice Sutherland's reflections on the implications of his opinion in Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936). He
recalls that "we concluded" in Powell that there were certain rights which were safeguarded
against the states by the due process clause" and "Among them the fundamental right of the
accused to aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution."
41316 U.S. 455 (1942).
The following comment by Dean Griswold and Benjamin Cohen (letter to New York
Times, August 2, 1942) was included with the Douglas dissent in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 677 (1948):
"Most Americans-lawyers and laymen alike-before the decision in Betts v. Brady
would have thought that the right of the accused to counsel in a serious criminal case
was unquestionably a part of our own Bill of Rights. Certainly the majority of the
Supreme Court which rendered the decision in Betts v. Brady would not wish their de-
cision to be used to discredit the significance of that right and the importance of its ob-
servances.
"Yet at a critical period in world history, Betts v. Brady dangerously tilts the scales
against the safeguarding of one of the most precious rights of man. . . . The right to
counsel for the poor as well as the rich, is an indispensable safeguard of freedom and
justice under law."
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
1964]
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If the case had come up from a federal court, under the 6th Amendment as
interpreted by Zerbst, reversal would have been mandatory. But, the Court
pointed out, "The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies
only to trials in the federal courts." 44 Powell was distinguished as a capital
case. The Court announced it would appraise case-by-case the consequences
of denial of counsel in state non-capital cases. Only where unfairness at the
trial was apparent would it grant constitutional relief. Justices Black, Douglas
and Murphy dissented with the comment that even "under the prevailing
view of due process" as stated in the opinion of the Court, the facts called for
reversal.
45
In the course of the case-by-case process of inclusion and exclusion following
Betts, the Court gradually underlined certain factors as significant in deter-
mining whether there was a constitutional right to counsel. In Uveges v.
Pennsylvania46 a 17-year old defendant had pleaded guilty to burglary and
been sentenced to twenty to forty years. In the face of uncontested evidence
that threats by the district attorney had preceded the plea of guilty, the Court
reversed. Due process had been violated by the unfairness resulting from ab-
sence of counsel, and the defendant's failure to ask for counsel was no bar to
relief. The Court took the occasion to summarize criteria it had developed
for reversal under the Betts rule:
Where the gravity of the crime and other factors-such as the age47 and educa-
tion of the defendant, the conduct of the court or the prosecuting officials, 48
and the complicated nature of the offenses charged and the defense thereto4 9-
render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in unjustice as to
be fundamentally unfair .... 50
In three cases subsequent to Uveges constitutional violation was again
found, 51 but the Betts v. Brady policy of case-by-case review was unqualified
by a straightforward general exception until Chandler v. Fretag,52 where a
potential fourth offender (charged with a three dollar larceny), facing a man-
datory life term as an habitual criminal, was denied opportunity to employ
counsel.
Chandler produced a general rule that there was an inviolable constitution-
" Id at 461.
5 Id at 475.
- 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
'7Wade v. Mayo, 312 U.S. 672 (1948); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Ma-
rino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); De
Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947). Cf. Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951).
,1 Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) ; cf. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949), Cash v. Cul-
ver, 358 U.S. 632 (1958).
10 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
51 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 145 (1951) ; Palmer v.
Ashe, 342 U.S. 144 (1951).
348 U.S. 3 (1954).
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al right to retain a lawyer in any case, capital or not. When considered in con-
nection with Griffin v. Illinois,3 this decision presented a challenge to the
Betts doctrine that was apparently not fully appreciated at the time.
Griffin involved the question of appeal under Illinois statutes, which be-
cause of the requirement of a trial transcript was not realistically available to
indigents. The Court recognized that due process did not guarantee a right of
appeal, yet where a state permits appeal it must be fairly available to all-
even though this may mean that the state must furnish the indigent appellant
a free trial transcript.54 Mr. Justice Black, for four members of the five-man
majority, based his conclusion on both due process and equal protection. 55
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, furnishing the controlling vote, limited his assent to
the equal protection ground. 56 Was the issue under Betts now narrowed? In
all cases, capital and non-capital, a defendant in the state courts who could
pay was entitled to counsel (Chandler). An indigent was entitled to equal
treatment on matters of appeal (Griffin). What satisfactory rational grounds
now remained for denying a general right to counsel to an indigent at this
trial?
The last favorable reference to Betts v. Brady in a prevailing opinion of the
court was in Cash v. Culver.57 A twenty year old defendant had been repre-
sented by counsel at his first trial for robbery, which ended in disagreement.
Unable to pay for counsel at a second trial called on one-day notice, he asked
for court appointment of counsel. This was denied. After conviction, he
sought reversal on due process grounds. The setting was available for the
coup de grace of Betts. But the court was not ready. A unanimous court re-
versed on the authority of Betts v. Brady. In the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart
there is no inkling of impending developments.
In the 17 years that have passed since its decision in Betts v. Brady ...this court
by a traditional process of inclusion and exclusion has indicated the factors so
apt to result in injustice as to violate the 14th Amendment.5 8
He quoted the criteria of Uveges59 and stressed that the dominant one of them
here in Cash6o was the complexity of the issues in the case.
The various shortcomings revealed in the state cases that reached the Court
underlined the question originally asked by Mr. Justice Douglas in his Bute
v. Illinois dissent:
- 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"On Griffin's implications see Annot., 55 A.L.R. 2d (1957) and 2 L. Ed. 2d 1644 (1958).
5Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) : . ...our own constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection both call for procedure in criminal trials which allow no
invidious discrimination between persons and different groups of persons."
5Id. at 21.
358 U.S. 632 (1958).
"Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 632, 636 (1958).
See text accompanying note 46, supra.
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Of what value is the constitutional guaranty of fair trial if an accused does not
have counsel to advise and defend him?61
The cumulative force of seven cases in the 1959 and 1960 terms intimated
that the implications of Chandler and Griffin had ripened.
Kinsella v. United States6 2 was not a 14th Amendment case, but one con-
cerning overseas court martials for civilians. Nevertheless, it was a straw in the
wind. The government invited the Court to extend the Betts distinction be-
tween capital and non-capital cases to such cases.63 The Court declined, al-
though Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent pressed for the extension of the
Betts "fair trial doctrine" to this new area.
In Hudson v. North Carolina,64 the Court, without mentioning Betts (al-
though Mr. Justice Frankfurter was in the majority), found "circumstances
...where the denial of counsel's assistance operated to deprive the defend-
ant of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment", for
when defendant's co-defendant pleaded guilty during the trial in the presence
of the jury, problems were raised "requiring professional knowledge and ex-
perience beyond a layman's ken." Justices Clark and Whittaker exploded in
dissent:
The opinion of the court bids fair to "furnish opportunities hitherto uncon-
templated for opening wide the prison doors of the land."65
They saw grave implications in the decision: "Without so much as mention-
ing Betts v. Brady [which they viewed as controlling] ...it cuts serious in-
roads into that holding." 66
In McNeal v. Culver6 7 the following term, a unanimous Court set aside the
conviction of an indigent defendant in a non-capital case. Mr. Justice Whit-
taker, writing for the Court, made no reference to Betts v. Brady, citing Cash
v. Culver68 as controlling. justices Douglas and Brennan, concurring, called
for the reversal of Betts v. Brady. They attached to their opinion a supplement
to the appendix Mr. Justice Black had filed with his dissenting opinion in
Betts. This supplement showed that the right to counsel was now recognized
in thirty three states in both capital and non-capital cases.
Reynolds v. Cochran6 9 was a unanimous decision reversing, for denial of
11358 U.S. 632, 637 (1958).
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 678 (1948).
6361 U.S. 234 (1960).
Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1955).
64363 U.S. 697 (1960).
363 U.S. 697, 704 (1960).
Ibid.
e365 U.S. 109 (1961).
358 U.S. 632 (1958).
365 U.S. 525 (1961).
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counsel, petitioner's conviction as a second offender in Florida, on the author-
ity of Chandler (in turn cited by Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, as
depending on Powell).
In Newsom v. Smyth7 ° the implications of Griffin7' were brought squarely
before the Court. Petitioner had been represented by counsel at his trial, con-
victed and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Virginia court, specifically
noting the question whether Griffin required counsel for an indigent defend-
ant on appeal, had denied the petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme
Court conceded that the case had been brought up precisely to consider the
right to counsel on appeal question 72 but, in a curious per curiam opinion,
dismissed the appeal for failure to present a federal question. Justice Douglas,
for himself, Chief Justice Warren and justice Black, wrote in dissent that the
counsel "Question . ..is present and ripe for decision."73
Ferguson v. Georgia74 concerned a Georgia statute that made a defendant
in a criminal case incompetent to testify under oath. It was a relic that existed
in no other common law jurisdiction. A companion statute permitted him to
make an unsworn statement, but without aid of counsel in its preparation.
Defendant's counsel tried to question him at his murder trial despite the un-
sworn statement statute. The Georgia court, standing on the statute's restric-
tion, refused. After conviction defendant sought reversal, arguing that the re-
fusal of the Georgia court to permit his counsel to interrogate him constituted
unconstitutional denial of right to counsel. The Court was in agreement that
the conviction must be reversed. Justice Brennan for the majority based his
opinion upon right to counsel; Justices Frankfurter and Clark preferred to
ground reversal upon invalidation of the incompetency statute. Justice Bren-
nan went out of his way to claim for the case a place in the retreat from Betts
v. Brady:
75
Our decision does not turn on the facts that the appellant was tried for a cap-
ital offense and was represented by employed counsel. The command of the
Fourteenth Amendment also applies in the case of an accused tried for a non-
capital offense, or represented by appointed counsel. (Chandler v. Fretag76).
Events now moved swiftly. In Carnley v. Cochran,7 7 a defendant convicted
after a jury trial under the Florida child molesting statute claimed denial of
right to counsel. All seven justices that participated voted for reversal. Four
1- 365 U.S. 604 (1961).
71 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
7- Newsom v. Smith, 365 U.S. 604 (1961).
73 Ibid.
71365 U.S. 570 (1961).
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
348 U.S. 3, 10. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). Cf. Justice Brennan (dissenting)
in Cohen v. Hurley, 365 U.S. 117 (1961).
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
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were on record in favor of discarding the Betts v. Brady rule, but one of them,
Justice Brennan (in the absence of Betts' chief supporter, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, because of illness) declined to join 78 the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Douglas in Mr. Justice Black's opinion that would overrule Betts v. Brady.
The interment was merely deferred. In the same term the Court handed
down an order granting an in forma pauperis motion and petition for certi-
orari and requested briefing and oral argument on the specific question
"Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady, 315 U.S. 455, be reconsid-
ered?" Gideon v. Cochran.79 On March 18th, 1963, the Court answered "yes"
and Betts v. Brady was overruled.8 0 Justices White and Goldberg were now on
the court in place of Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter, two Betts support-
ers. But it was not a question of mathematics. There was no dissenting voice.
The Court's opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black. Justices Clark and
Harlan added concurring opinions of their own, but only Harlan seemed to
half hold back a tear. Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the Court's opinion, but
in a separate one indicated mild chagrin that the Court had not taken the oc-
casion to adopt the blanket formula of the Black-Douglas dissent in Adamson
v. California8l that would incorporate in the 14th Amendment the specific
terms of the first eight Amendments.
B. Gideon v. Wainwright
The indigent defendant in Gideon had been denied counsel in his non-capital
case as Florida law specified that he should be. Charged with entering a pool-
room with intent to commit a misdemeanor, he had conducted his own trial.
He was convicted and sentenced to serve five years. Justice Black found the
facts and circumstances here so akin to Betts, so devoid of special circum-
stances, that "we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing would re-
quire us to reject Gideon's claim that the Constitution guarantees him the as-
sistance of counsel."8 2 Accordingly, he added, "Upon full reconsideration we
conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled." 83
a. The Black Opinion
Justice Black was boundless in his victory. The 6th Amendment spoke clearly
enough. Federal courts had construed it in straightforward fashion to mean
" Cf. Justice Brennan's dissent in McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) and his James
Madison Lecture at New York University, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y. U. L.
REv. 761 (1961).
370 U.S. 908 (1962).
"372 U.S. 335 (1963).
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
'Id. at 339: "Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as
could be expected from a layman." Id. at 337.
81 Id., at 339.
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counsel must be furnished unless the right is intelligently waived. Betts, as a
defendant, had argued that "this right is extended to indigent defendants in
state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment."8' 4 The Betts court, had based its
holding that the 6th Amendment "laid down no rule of conduct of the state"
upon "historical data" that there was no such practice prior to the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, or, indeed, in "the judicial history of the states to the
present date."85 The Betts court did not, then, view the appointment of coun-
sel for an indigent defendant as "a fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial."8 6 But there was ample precedent available to the Betts court, urges
Justice Black, to the effect "that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which
are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are
equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Black cites here Powell v. Alabama (6th Amendment),
the 1st Amendment free speech-press-assembly cases that followed in a steady
stream after Gitlow v. New York,87 the long-standing 5th Amendment "in-
corporation" by the 14th as to "just compensation" and the more recent "in-
corporations" concerning the 4th8 8 and 8th Amendments.8 9 Betts was right,
says Justice Black, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamen-
tal and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was "wrong", adds Black, in concluding that
the 6th Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental
rights.90 Powell had, ten years before, "unequivocally declared that 'the right
to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character' ". Black concedes that
Powell (a capital case) had "limited its holding to the particular facts and
circumstances of that case." 91 But this is a frequent mannerism of this Court.
Still, in Grosjean v. American Press Co.92 and in Johnson v. Zerbst,93 the Court
stressed the fundamental nature of this constitutional right to counsel. The
true posture of the situation, Black concludes, is that the Court in Betts had
"made an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents."
In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but
restore constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice.9 4
Justice Black next turns from "history" and the "ancient" Powell learning
81 Id., at 340.
"'Ibid. (citing Betts, 316 U.S. 445, 465).
10 Ibid.
-268 U.S. 652 (1925).
1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
0 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342.
91 Id., at 343.
9297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
- 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344.
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of 1932 (Betts arrived in 1942), to "reason and reflection," and to the "obvious
truth" that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him."9 5 Justice Black points to the availability of coun-
sel to governments prosecuting and to monied defendants defending. What-
ever the rule elsewhere, a lawyer in our country is not a luxury but a necessity.
"The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed funda-
mental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours." 96 Mr.
Justice Black then urges that from the beginning our polity has "laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
trials .... ." But "This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him."
The telling passage of Mr. Justice Sutherland on the feebleness of a defense
without counsel is then invoked, 97 and the Betts court is accused of departing
from this "sound wisdom." Black concludes with a neat statistic. Only three
states at the Court argument (as amici curiae) had asked that Betts be "kept
intact." Twenty two argued that Betts was "an anachronism when handed
down." 98
b. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Clark sees Gideon simply as erasing a distinction between capital and
non-capital crimes "which has no basis in logic" and an increasingly eroded
basis in authority99 . Justice Harlan insists that Betts merely urged that there
might be "special circumstances" in non-capital cases where lack of counsel
might prejudice a "fair trial". No case since 1950,100 notes Justice Harlan,
failed to reveal such "special circumstances". Case after case found new sets of
"special circumstances". "In truth," he concludes, "the Betts v. Brady rule is
no longer a reality."''1 1
C. Reprise
The Gideon doctrine had emerged only gradually. The 6th Amendment itself
originally envisaged merely the right to engage counsel. Not until Powell in
1932 had a constitutional right to appointed counsel been recognized in even
a capital case. Johnson v. Zerbst, six years later, declared that this right in the
95 Ibid.
Ibid.
See text accompanying note 139, infra.
0 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345.
® Cf. Kinsella v. U.S. 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1960). See text accompanying notes 62, 63 and 74, supra.
100 Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950).
oI Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).
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federal courts extended to non-capital cases as well. But the reach of Powell
in the state courts was limited by Betts to capital cases, although Betts would
allow relief to defendants even in non-capital cases where "special circum-
stances" were shown. Chandler then made it clear that a defendant who could
pay for counsel in a state court was entitled to have one, whether the case was
capital or not. Griffin found a disparity in appellate opportunity keyed to af-
fluence or indigence constitutionally odious. Meanwhile, through the years,
the Court found category after category of "special circumstances" that made
denial of counsel fatal. The states themselves turned against the Betts rule.
Noble or ignoble, the experiment with ad hoc judicial supervision had failed.
Betts was obviously non-viable. Gideon merely ratified its death.
D. Gideon's Limits and Implications
Whether Gideon extends to all criminal trials,10 2 or to felonies alone or to any
crime that carries "the possibility of a substantial prison sentence"'103 is still
open. The right to counsel does extend to the "first appeal" as a matter of
"equal protection".104 The exact point at which it comes into being is still
being explored. Current case law suggests the line as being from arraignment
in the event of a capital offense, 101 and after indictment in a non-capital of-
fense.' 06 But the working tool seems to be: "at any 'critical' stage of the pro-
'Eeding", whatever that may prove to be. Another problem to be worked out
is the extent of retroactivity to be given to Gideon. justice Clark, writing on
this point, recalls that Griffin had been given retroactive effect by the
('Cnurt.10 7 But the situations are not at all on all fours.'08
102 See Simeone and Richardson, The Indigent and His Right to Legal Assistance in Crzm-
inal Cases, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 15, 21, 23 (1963).
10 Harlan, J. (concurring) in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).
104 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), decided the same day as Gideon.
1 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
x Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
'o Clark, The Sixth Amendment and the Law of the Land, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 9 (1963)
.. It may be that the question would be governed by our opinions holding that the
right of an indigent to a sufficiently full record of the proceedings is retrospective." The
leading case is Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
's A reversal in the counsel situation would involve freeing the prisoner when the statute
of limitations may have run; in the Griffin type situation he remains a prisoner, of course,
during appeal. There was some relief open under Betts, i.e., if special circumstances existed,
though this is now seen as inadequate. Two recent Court of Appeals cases have held that
Gideon must be applied retroactively. Durocher v. LaVallee, - F. 2d - (2 Cir., March 26,
1964), 32 U.S. L. WEEK 2503, and Craig v. Myers -F. 2d -, (3 Cir. April 2, 1964), 32
U.S. L. WEEK 2519. The Second Circuit case, heard en banc, produced the dictum that the
question of retroactive application of Gideon was no longer open after Doughty v. Maxwell
- U.S. -, 84 S. Ct. 702 (1964). But Doughty's two-sentence per curiam opinion cites
first Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (where Justice Black concurred that the appeal
was sound "even under the constitutional doctrine announced in Betts v. Brady") ; only in
second place did the Doughty court cite Gideon. The Gideon retroactivity question remains
open in the Supreme Court.
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Gideon v. Wainwright bears comparison with the landmark decision of two
years before, Mapp v. Ohio.109 In Mapp the Court held that all evidence ob-
tained by illegal search and seizure in violation of the federal constitution is
inadmissible in trials in state courts. In Wolf v. Colorado10 , only twelve years
earlier, the Court had held that the 4th Amendment prohibition of unreason-
able searches and seizures was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
thus applicable against the states." But it had declined to impose on the states
the federal Weeks"' rule against using at trials the fruits of an illegal search.
As in Betts, the Court applied to state action something less than the full fed-
eral rule. Mapp changed Wolf in the same spirit that Gideon changed Betts.
How do these two recent cases fit into a reconsideration of the general for-
mulae used by the Court in due process interpretation? To this subject the in-
quiry now turns.
III
THE DUE PROCEss FORMULAE
From the Magna Carta at Runnymede in 1215 ("the law of the land") to the
Fifth Amendment in 1791 (the first use of the term due process of law in an
American constitution) is a direct line. Until Barron v. Baltimore1 2 more
than a suspicion existed that due process was a limitation upon state action.
That case settled it was not. Not until 22 years later did the Supreme Court
furnish a formula to measure due process. The history of the Court's efforts
to identify the general content of due process may be told in terms of four
landmark cases: Murray, Hurtado, Twining and Palko, and in that order.
Murray
In the first major pronouncement, Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improve-
ment Company," 3 two tests were adopted: (1) the terms of the constitution
itself; (2) "old process", "those settled usages and modes of proceeding exist-
ing in the common and statute law of England before the immigration of our
ancestors," provided not "unsuited" to our need.
Hurtado
The next formulation of criteria awaited the post-Civil War amendments that
subjected state action to due process safeguards. Davidson v. New Orleans"1
4
'0 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
U0338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
1159 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
,96 U.S. 97 (1877).
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produced a phrase of humble sagacity that is still occasionally met in the
search for "the intent and application" of due process: "the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall re-
quire."' 15 But Hurtado v. California"6 is the second landmark in due process
formulation. Mr. Justice Black cites Hurtado in Gideon only to note that one
of its suggested formulations proved to be a "dud". 117 But Hurtado's claim
to attention lies elsewhere, and it is still considerable.
The defendant in Hurtado had been convicted after indictment by informa-
tion rather than by the grand jury process that had been de rigeur in Eng-
land at the time of our breakaway. Defendant contended that this process
violated the 14th Amendment, since Murray had said due process is "old
process".
Mr. Justice Matthews for the Court rejected this restrictive view, insisting
that the basic constitutional guarantees do not merely consecrate "particular
forms of procedure", but constitute "the very substance of individual rights
to life, liberty and property." ' l s These rights consist in "those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and po-
litical institutions." 119 They are not rigidly frozen but "developed by a pro-
gressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the
forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time, new expression and
greater effect to modern ideas of self-government."' 20 The judicial technique
for noting this development is rich in its resources: history, comparative law,
natural law (in the sense of "justice-suum cuique tribuere"), and experi-
ence. 12 ' The final objective is always "furtherance of the general public
good."1
22
Respect was owed to the process and laws of the states. Due process in the
14th Amendment "refers to that law of the land in each State, which derives
its authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the State" operating
"15Id. at 104. The life of this dictum of Davidson has outlasted its holding concerning
eminent domain, overruled in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1896). This latter case marked the first recognition by the Court of a right specified
in the Bill of Rights as protected against state action by the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment.
- 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
"'7Justice Matthews in Hurtado had suggested (110 U.S. 516, 534) that the terms (usus
loquendi) of the Constitution itself afforded a basis for sustaining the state process. The 5th
Amendment spoke separately of "grand jury" and "due process". It was to be presumed that
there were no superfluous words in the Constitution. Due process in the 14th Amendment
was used in the same sense as in the 5th. Here was a quick answer to the suggestion that
"grand jury" was safeguarded by the 14th Amendment. The "mechanical test" was first by-
passed in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, supra, note 115, and subsequent-
ly in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) and in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"I' Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
11
9 Id. at 535.
I" Id. at 530.
Im Id. at 531.
'DId. at 537.
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within the bounds of the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice." The
"greatest security" for these principles "resides in the right of the people to
make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure."'
123
Justice Matthews went on to the counterbalance to state action in the con-
stitutional scheme. "But it is not to be supposed that these legislative powers
are absolute and despotic, and that the amendment prescribing due process
of law is too vague and indefinite to operate as a practical restraint." Justice
Matthews stressed the ultimate rational foundation of all law. "It is not every
act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something more than mere will ex-
erted as an act of power."'
124
The chief early concern in due process litigation was with the adequacy of
notice and hearing. The Supreme Court's hesitation to interfere with any state
legislative action, as typified by the Slaughter-House Cases,125 Hurtado itself,
and Munn v. Illinois126, was replaced by a new judicial self-assertiveness. The
vigorous Field dissents127 in the name of "natural justice" and "liberty of con-
tract" became majority doctrine. 28 A new chapter of due process was sketched
out and written, substantive due process striking at state economic legislation.
It was the era of judicial supremacy in the economic area. Parallel was a reso-
lute judicial self-abnegation in the field of personal liberties.
Twining
The next landmark was Twining v. New Jersey.Y29 New Jersey practice per-
mitted court comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand. Defendant
attacked this provision as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, which he asserted to be guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. In uphold-
121 Id. at 535.
1., Ibid.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1875).
'-94 U.S. 113 (1876).
"- Cf. Ex Parte Wall., 107 U.S. 265 (1882); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111
U.S. 746, 754 (1883) ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
"= Cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (Peckham, J.); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908) (Harlan, J.); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (Pitney, J.); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Peckham, J.). On this period generally, see Pound, The
Growth of Administrative Justice, 2 Wis. L. REV. 321 (1924); Hough, Due Process of Law-
Today, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218 (1919). HAINES, REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 198 ft.
(1931), attributes the movement to the influence of "natural law" doctrines. Pound suggests
another analysis: "The judges were imbued with a genuine faith in the tenets of the his-
torical school, especially the political interpretation and the doctrine of progress from status
to contract. Hence it seemed to them that the constitutional requirement of due process of
law was violated by legislative attempts to restore status and restrict the contractual powers
of free men by enacting that men of full age and sound mind in particular callings should
not be able to make agreements which other men might make freely". POUND, INTERPRETA-
TION OF LEGAL HISTORY 63 (1923). Corwin attributes the "individualistic interpretation of
the 14th Amendment" to "principles of Lockian individualism and of Spencerian Laissez
Faire". Corwin, The Supreme Court and the 14th Amendment, 7 Micn. L. REV. 643, 646, 652
(1909).
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ing the New Jersey practice, Mr. justice Moody outlined three complementary
tests. Due process was: 1) Old process (Murray); but 2) it was not every old
process (Hurtado); 3) old or new, the Court would sustain against state action
only those processes which constituted "established principles of private rights
and distributive justice,"'1 0 "immutable principles of justice which inhere in
the very idea of free government,"
13' "fundamental rights. 13 2
Without rejecting anything that had been said in Hurtado (in fact, pur-
porting to follow that case), Twining gave the doctrine a new emphasis. Not
every commonly accepted process was contained within the protected sphere-
only rights that were clearly "fundamental." Justice Moody's opinion laid its
chief stress upon the expression of popular will through state action. The
judicial veto, he inferred, would be sparingly employed-at least within the
sphere of procedural due process.
The years following Twining found economic substantive due process still
ascendant, reaching its high water mark in spirit in the 5th Amendment Dis-
trict of Columbia minimum wage case, Adkins v. Children's Hospital.1'3 3 A
new and startling development in the 14th Amendment due process was the
extension of that Amendment to include the substantive free speech and free
press guarantees mentioned in the 1st Amendment.
34
Powell Again
In Powell,135 as we have seen, the issue was posed whether the "right to as-
sistance of counsel," guaranteed in those words against the federal govern-
ment by the 6th Amendment, was protected against state action under the
14th. The Court conceded that counsel was not guaranteed at common law
at the time of the enactment of the Constitution. The Murray formula, al-
though it had been used by the Court recently enough for Mr. Justice Stone to
have been the successful counsel, 36 did not present a formidable hurdle.
The 6th Amendment expressly mentioned "assistance of counsel"; it was
obviously then not included within due process in the 5th Amendment. But
this mechanical exclusion test of Hurtado was no bar. It had been found want-
- 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
'3 Id. at 101.
"I Id. at 102.
"8 Ibid.
- 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
13 This development commenced with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The other
leading cases in this line include Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (speech); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1933),
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (as-
sembly); Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religion--'free exercise'); Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (religion--"establishment'). For the earlier cases see Warren, The New
"Liberty" under the 14th Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926).
'-287 U.S. 45 (1932).
I Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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ing before. 137 All nine justices (including Justice Butler, who dissented)
agreed in Powell that effective "assistance of counsel" was required by 14th
Amendment due process in that capital case.
In his opinion in Powell, holding in that capital case that there had been
a denial of "Assistance of Counsel" which violated the due process protection
of the 14th Amendment, Justice Sutherland had conceded that under the
Murray formula an affirmance of the conviction would have been required,
for there had been no right to counsel in felony cases in 18th century England.
The mechanical rule aspect of Hurtado would also have gone against relief.
But this was a "rule of construction," and not without exceptions, as the re-
cent recognition of freedom of speech, press and assembly protection against
state action by the 14th Amendment had made clear.138 Twining had recog-
nized the evolving concept of "fundamental rights" that Hurtado had first
embraced. It was in this spirit that Powell was decided.
Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell strongly stressed the pressing
relevance of assistance of counsel to a fair trial:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence ir-
relevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prove his defense, even though he may have a perfect one.
He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him.139
But the Court expressly confined itself to the case at hand, "a capital case,
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately
of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy,
or the like." In such a case at least, due process is violated if a state court does
not make effective, timely assignment of counsel.
Palko
The next major formulation of due process after Twining was Mr. Justice
Cardozo's effort in Palko v. Connecticut.140 It has since 1937 been the prevail-
ing standard in the Court, although its future standing is in doubt.
Palko was indicted for 1st degree murder. He received a 2nd degree con-
See note 117, supra.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-7 (1932).
Id. at 69.
1302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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viction and a life sentence. On appeal under a permissive statute, the state
won reversal. The new trial brought a 1st degree conviction and death sen-
tence. Palko appealed. In affirming, against a claim of alleged double
jeopardy, Justice Cardozo found his way prepared by Hurtado, Twining,
Powell, and the 1st Amendment cases. 141 In the "1st Amendment cases" there
had been no automatic absorption:
If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has
had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.' 42
Was this such a fundamental right? There might be cases on both sides of the
line. But there was also a unifying, rational principle that would place them
here or there. Was this statute, this decision to be set aside? Before going on,
the Court needed answers to preliminary questions. Did the statute or de-
cision defile immunities which were "implicit in the concept of ordered liber-
ty" ("of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty")? Did it subject de-
fendant "in the particular situation" to "a hardship so acute and shocking
that our polity will not endure it?" And (citing the Hebert143 dictum), "Does
it violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions'?" Did the state's criminal ap-
peal in Palko violate such a principle?
The answer surely must be "no". A reciprocal privilege, subject at all times to
the discretion of the presiding judge . . . has now been granted to the state.
There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of justice stands, its symmetry,
to many, greater than before.'
44
The fixed historical measure of due process suggested by Murray had been
concerned only with procedure. Hurtado opened the way to a flexible ap-
proach. At the time of Hurtado emphasis was still on procedural due process,
predominantly the right to notice and a fair hearing. There followed the
rumblings in the Field and Harlan dissents of the forthcoming judicial ac-
tivism in the substantive economic field. Twining may have been designed as
a brake on the Court in both fields. If so, it did not succeed. The high stand-
"' Justice Cardozo's chief reliance was on Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). He
found that the Twining opinion had recognized "that some of the personal rights safe-
guarded by the first eight Amendments against national action may also be safeguarded
against state action . . . not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amend-
ments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due
process of law". Justice Cardozo cited this passage from Twining (211 U.S. 78, 99) in his
note 4.
142Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
" Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926) (McReynolds, J.).
'"Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
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ard the Twining opinion had set-of "fundamental rights"-was held satis-
fied by guarantees of freedom of speech-press-assembly, which were protected
as against federal action by the 1st Amendment. It seemed to some, from
Powell and Palko, that the high standard had been met by "right to assistance
of counsel." '4 5 But Betts,1 46 as has been seen, checked that impression so far
as non-capital cases were concerned. And this check did much to provoke the
Black dissent in A damson, the opening gun in the "classic debate."
IV
BEYOND Palko: THE Adamson DISSENT AND THE "CLASSIC DEBATE."
A. The Adamson Dissent
The basic division in the Court in the right to counsel cases had been between
those Justices who insist upon a case-by-case appraisal to determine whether
a "fair trial" had been vitiated by the absence of counsel, and those who saw
an absolute, unqualified right to counsel in any serious case. This latter posi-
tion was merely a particularized instance of a suggestion twice made by the
first Justice Harlan 147 that the 14th Amendment had incorporated the first
eight Amendments of the Constitution, that it specifically secured against the
states those rights which the federal Bill of Rights had secured against federal
action, that is, that it had been designed to reverse Barron v. Baltimore.4 8
This contention was revived again by justice Black in his dissenting
1,5 In Eaton v. Price Justice Brennan suggests there was an implication by Justice Cardozo
in Palko against putting the right to counsel on an ad hoc basis. He repeats this suggestion
in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). Actually, the Palko opinion is ambivalent on this
point. Cf., ". . . the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it unlawful
for a state to abridge by its statutes ...the right of one accused of crime to the benefit of
counsel, Powell v. Alabama. . . .In these and other situations immunities that are valid as
against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments
[Justice Cardozo prints the text of the 1st and 6th Amendments in a footnote] have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, become valid as against the states." 302 U.S. 319, 324. With this passage must
be compared his later reference to Powell: "The decision did not turn upon the fact that the
benefit of counsel would have been guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions of the
Sixth Amendment if they had been prosecuted in a federal court. The decision turned upon
the fact that in the particular situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel
was essential to the substance of a hearing." 302 U.S. 319, 327.
"5 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
"' In his dissent in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900). He repeated the contention
in his dissent in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). The first attempts at the "in-
corporation" argument were made in Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887), (argument by
counsel), and in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), (dissent by Field J.). Maxwell
definitely rejected the contention that the 14th Amendment in its "privileges and immu-
nities" clause furnished a restriction against state action.
"I Supra, note 112.
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opinion in Adamson v. California49 in which Justice Douglas concurred in its
entirety,"' 0 and Justices Murphy and Rutledge in subtantial part. The A dam-
son dissent, though unsuccessful in persuading a Court majority, provoked
what Justice Brennan has referred to as "the classic debate."' It may prove
to be more than a bit of recent history for it appears that at least four of the
present justices have not rejected the Black position.
152
The cast of Justice Black's thinking is nowhere more sharply set than in his
concurring opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.1"3 In Interna-
tional Shoe, Chief Justice Stone for the Court wrote that the due process test
of the jurisdiction of a state to tax foreign corporations was "the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." The Court
was unanimous in result, but Justice Black saw in the new formula an instance
of judicial tentacles reaching out where they did not belong. Procedurally, he
would dismiss the appeal as unsubstantial and "decline to formulate broad
rules as to the meaning of due process" 154 before constitutional necessity de-
manded. He had more to say:
I believe that the federal constitution leaves to each state, without any "ifs" or
"buts", a power to tax and to open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue
corporations whose agents do business in those states. . . . I think it a judicial
deprivation to condition its exercise upon this court's notion of "fair play", how-
ever appealing that term may be.1"
The thrust here was clearly against a revival of substantive economic due pro-
cess. The next passage makes this abundantly clear:
There is a strong emotional appeal in the words "fair play," "justice" and "rea-
sonableness". But they were not chosen by those who wrote the original Consti-
1 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). Justice Black had made a sharp challenge to what he viewed as
judicial activism in his dissent in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
where he charged that in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), "another court, with a different
belief as to fundamental justice" had withdrawn "Constitutional protection from ... basic
freedoms." Id. at 325 and note 2.
"I 22a. In Poe v. Ullnan, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961), Justice Douglas indicates a modification
of his agreement with Justice Black in Adamson to the extent that he no longer thinks that
the 14th Amendment is "restricted and confined to" the content of the first eight Amend-
ments. He cites the recent recognition of a "right to travel" in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
125-7 (1958). He adds that "Liberty is a conception that sometimes gains content from the
emanations of other specific guarantees (NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) or
from experience with the requirements of a free society." Id. at 517.
1 Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
" See Brennan, J. in Cohen v. Hurley, 365 U.S. 117, 154 (1961) (dissenting opinion) and
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
'0326 U.S. 310, 322 (1945).
4 326 U.S. 310, 322 (1945).
"I Id. at 324.
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tution or the Fourteenth Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use
in invalidating State or Federal laws passed by elected representatives.' 56
Justice Black wished judicial withdrawal from the field of liberties to be all
but complete, beyond a mere mechanical vindication of rights that had al-
ready been recognized. To allow a wider scope was to invite their curtailment.
Superimposing the natural justice concept on the Constitution's specific pro-
hibitions could operate as a drastic abridgment of democratic safeguards they
embody, such as freedom of speech, press and religion, and the right to coun-
sel.' 5 7
He conceded frankly that the 1st Amendment liberties had themselves been
drawn into 14th Amendment protection:
... only because the Court, as then constituted, believe[d] them to be require-
ments of fundamental justice.15s
The threat remained of withdrawal of this protection of speech "under the
same rule" by "another Court, with a different belief as to fundamental jus-
tice," which could:
• . . at least against state action, completely or partially withdraw Constitution-
al protection from these basic freedoms, just as though the First Amendment had
never been written. 159
He was not, he was quick to point out, idly speculating. "This has already
happened. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455."
How to protect the liberties so recently confirmed against state action from
intrusion by a future Court, and yet forestall intrusion on the prerogatives of
the states in the economic field? The Black answer would be to revive the con-
tention of Justice Harlan in his Maxwell and Twining dissents that due proc-
ess was a concept whose content was measured by, and limited to, the first
eight amendments to the Constitution.
Adamson v. California'6 0 gave Justice Black his opportunity to present this
position. Under California law the failure of a defendant to explain or deny
evidence against him could be commented upon by the court and by counsel,
and considered by the jury. Adamson was convicted of murder in the first de-
gree under this practice. He claimed that this constituted involuntary self-in-
crimination, which constituted violation both of a national "privilege" and
of the guarantee against self-incrimination of the due process clause of the
151 Id. at 325.
157 Ibid.
"I Id., note 2.
' Ibid.
", 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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14th Amendment. The majority disagreed with these contentions. Mr. Justice
Reed, for four justices, was content to characterize the question as settled by
Twining and Palko. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, stressed the peculiar
claim to respect enjoyed by Palko and Twining ("one of the outstanding
opinions in the history of the Court"). 161 Justice Black strongly attacked
Twining. He demanded that it be overruled both on its precise holding (on
self-incrimination), and on its general theory (" 'the natural law' theory of
the Constitution upon which it relies"). 62 The debate was launched. Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas concurred in the Black opinion that the 14th Amendment due
process clause embraced the first eight amendments and nothing more. Jus-
tices Rutledge and Murphy agreed with the Black dissent insofar as it pro-
claimed inclusion of the first eight amendments in the 14th. But they "were
not prepared to say" that the 14th Amendment due process clause "is entirely
and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights."'163
The Black opinion reexamined the authorities relied on by Mr. Justice
Moody in the prevailing opinion in Twining. In the elaborate historical ap-
pendix to Justice Black's opinion in Adamson there is no significant new
material not already passed on by Moody. 164 Black's point was simply that of
Justice Harlan in his Twining dissent: that the design of the 14th Amend-
ment due process clause had been to reverse the effect of Barron v. Bal-
timore, 65 and thus make the first eight amendments applicable to the states.
Justice Black "distinguished" Palko from Twining. Twining would apply
none of the first eight amendments to the states. Palko involved a "selective
process" that would apply "some of them."'166 Of the two techniques he pre-
ferred the latter. But the correct historical view was to apply them all. He re-
newed his International Shoe condemnation of "natural law" formulas:
Conceding the possibility that this Court is now wise enough to improve on the
Bill of Rights, I think the possibility is entirely too speculative to agree to take
that course. 167
Justice Black was sensitive to the sly suggestion that his position "would un-
wisely increase the sum total of the powers of this Court to invalidate state
1"1 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, (1947).
162 Id. at 70.
161 Id. at 124.
184 Justice Black apparently relied heavily upon Haines' writings and upon FLACK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 1908. The Moody opinion also conceded that
there was some support for the "incorporation" argument among those who were respon-
sible for the framing and adoption of the 14th Amendment. Justice Black laid stress upon
the development subsequent to Twining. But this bridge had been crossed in Palko.
1632 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
160 This distinction of the analysis in Twining from that in Palko was not warranted. See
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 note 4 (1937).
'"'Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947).
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legislation.' 68 He fastened upon the word "unwisely," asking if the Federal
Government had been "harmfully burdened" by sustaining the demands of
the Bill of Rights. The Black counter-suggestion was that only a one-sided
form of judicial self-abnegation limited "substantially this Court's power to
prevent state violations of the individual civil liberties guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights,"'16 9 and left it free:
* . . in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at large in the broad expanses
of policy and morals, and to trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain of
the states as well as the Federal Government.170
The implication was clear. Only by accepting the "incorporation" formula
could the two desired objectives be obtained-supervision of state laws and
procedures in the field of civil liberties, and a hands-off policy in the area of
economic legislation.
The issues reopened by the Adamson dissenters were promptly aired in the
literature,' 71 as they would be in the court. All that could be said on the legis-
lative origins of the Fourteenth Amendment had soon been said. If the Black
historical contentions were not disproved, they remained clearly unproved. 72
B. The "Debate"
The debate in the Court turned again to "the gradual process of inclusion and
exclusion" (Davidson),1ar the content of "fundamental rights" (Palko).
174
To the Adamson dissenters, later often in company with Chief justice War-
ren and justice Brennan, the line in such situations could be drawn only sub-
jectively, on the basis of individual preferences of judges. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter and Justices Reed, Burton, Clark, and Harlan, following the Palko
view, insisted upon the availability of objective criteria. Various guides to ob-
16 I bid.
161 Ibid. Here he cited Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
170 Ibid.
17 Comment ranged from strong opposition to the Black contentions (see Fairman, Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights-The Original Understanding?
2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949), and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights-The Judicial Interpretation? 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949) ), to strong support
(see Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History" and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1954)). For a median view see Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66 YALE L. J. 319 (1956).
172 Morrison's conclusion seems overdrawn: "The real significance of Adamson v. California
is that four judges are willing to distort history as well as the language of the framers in
order to read into the Constitution provisions which they think ought to be there." 2 STAN.
L. REV. 140, 162 (1949). A more moderate comment is that of Kadish, supra, n. 46. ". . . the
evidence is neither so compelling nor ambiguous to have impelled" Justice Black's approach.
66 YALE L. J. 319, 335 (1956).
' Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
7I Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The original introduction of the "fundamen-
tal rights" concept had been in Hurtado: the term was first used as such in Twining.
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jectivity were offered by them: History, 17 5 a community "sense of justice,' 17
sociological statistics, 177 "a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of sci-
ence." 178 Emphasis was placed upon a community consensus, "the conscience
of society."' 179 This was ascertainable ("as best as it may be") because of the
very nature of the Court, "a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed
by the best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment."'
8 0
To Justices Black and Douglas this detachment was an illusion: "emotion
rather than reason dictates the answers."' 8' "Due process under the prevailing
doctrine is what the judges say it is; and it differs from judge to judge."1 8 2 Due
process had become "a tool of the activists who respond to their own visceral
reactions in deciding what is fair, decent or reasonable."'1
8 3
Justice Frankfurter continued, over violent opposition, to stress: the evolv-
ing aspect of due process ("due process does not preclude new ends of govern-
ment or new means for achieving them");8 4 the "manifold variety and per-
plexity of the tasks" of the other branches of government and of the states,
which forecloses "a doctrinaire conception" of due process;' 8 5 the need of the
Court to strike "the balance of individual hurt and justifying public good,"'
186
and to recognize "that what is unfair in one situation may be fair in an-
other...".187
Dissenting in the same case in which Justice Frankfurter (concurring) had
made the above observations, justice Douglas restated his position and that
of Mr. Justice Black:"I think due process is described in the Constitution and
limited and circumscribed by it.''188 The prevailing concept was a "chamele-
on-like," "free-wheeling concept of due process," which "turns on the personal
predilections of the judge."' 8 9
175 Due process "is itself an historical product". Frankfurter J. in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 168 (1952). Cf. Frankfurter J. in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959), and in
Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951) (concurring opinion).
17, "Due process is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction . . . but by that
whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' " Clark J. in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432, 436 (1957); ". . . methods that offend a sense of justice," Frankfurter J. in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
177 Cf. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (Appendix).
178 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
'7""The Anglo-American system of law is based not upon transcendental revelation but
upon the conscience of society . Frankfurter J. in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128
(1959).
1s0 Frankfurter J. in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128 (1959).
Douglas J. in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 506 (1960).
1 s Id. at 505.
1s3 Ibid.
18s Frankfurter, J. in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 493 (1960).
1s5 Id. at 487.
'" Ibid.
1s7 Ibid.
"I Id. at 507.
" -ld. at 506.
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The "debate" ended, but its first fruit soon fell in the form of the Mapp
and Gideon retreat from a double state-federal standard in due process. Was
the traditional Hurtado-Twining-Palko due process approach to survive? The
Court engaged in its own "agonizing reappraisal." And this meant giving seri-
ous reconsideration to the Adamson dissent, and to a more modest "selective
incorporation."
V
IMPORTANT NON-SENSE: Adamson AGAIN, "SELECTIVE INCORPORATION"
In a separate opinion in Gideon Mr. Justice Douglas hints broadly that he is
hopeful of favorable reconsideration of the viewpoint of the Adamson dis-
sent. 9 0 Two years before, Mr. Justice Brennan took elaborate care to point
out that he and Chief Justice Warren had neither endorsed nor rejected the
Adamson dissent.19a Of the new members on the Court Mr. Justice White has
given sufficient indication that he is not apt to join this alignment. 192 But
there is no clear word pro or con from Mr. Justice Goldberg. For the first time
in the history of the Court the view of "total incorporation" of the first eight
Amendments into the 14th vi et armis is a practical possibility.
From the time of his Adamson dissent, in which Mr. Justice Black made
Twining his ostensible quarry, it was evident that his true target was Palko
and its formula of "ordered liberty" that permitted judges to assess each new
asserted right against the test of "fundamentality". 19 We have seen why Black
would jettison this formula: the possibility of retreat by a future Court from
liberties now protected and from the policy of self-restraint in the economic
field.19 4 His cause c6lkbre in opposition to the "ordered liberty" view was
Betts v. Brady. It is natural to expect that he will now pursue further efforts
to make his Adamson formula that of the Court. Does Gideon contain some
hidden link to this end?
In asking what does Gideon mean we may first note two solid gains beyond
its square holding reversing Betts: (1) Justice Black's emphasis that a "fun-
damental right" might be entitled to constitutional recognition though it was
not shared widely beyond our nation' 95 brushes close to the Institutionalists'
110 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). But see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515
(1961), where Justice Douglas withdrew from the position that the 14th Amendment is
"restricted and confined to" the content of the first eight Amendments. See supra note 150.
19 Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960).
'-, See his dissenting opinion in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 695 (1962).
a See text accompanying notes 152-157, supra.
a' See text accompanying notes 169-170, supra.
"9",The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours." Black J. in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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conception of the "idea" of the national group, and is a gain over the more
global terminology of Hurtado and Palko. (2) It seems that Gideon accentu-
ates a development, reflected in other recent cases, 1
96 away from permitting a
two-fold standard for assertion of a "fundamental right", one standard in the
Bill of Rights against the federal government, and another in the 14th
Amendment against the states. There was logical value in the contention,
made chiefly by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, that the factor of state-fed-
eral relationship makes it reasonable to require a greater infringement to con-
stitute violation of a protected liberty by a state than would constitute an in-
fringement by the federal government. But the logical strength of this point
has been clearly outweighed by its sociological weakness. Our society is too in-
tegral to take kindly or practically to a double standard of liberty depending
on whether the infringer is state or federal government. The recognition of
this point in Gideon may give impetus to another form of "incorporation"
doctrine, one not aimed at drawing the entire first eight Amendments into
the 14th, but only a selected few. This has been recently referred to as "selec-
tive incorporation" and designated as the "Brennan view."'197
The dissatisfaction with the double standard brings into target range three
cases closely associated with the "ordered liberty", "fundamental rights" doc-
trine; Twining (which involved court comment on failure of defendant to
take the stand, arguably a form of self-incrimination), 198 Palko (which in-
volved an arguable form of double jeopardy), and Adamson (a Twining type
situation). Change in the rule in each case could be rationalized in any one of
the four ways to which we have already called attention. Which way is prefer-
able?
a) The Black Adamson dissent
The 5th Amendment with its double jeopardy and self-incrimination provi-
sions, as well as the others of the first eight Amendments, and nothing else,
would be "incorporated" into the 14th.
b) The Rutledge-Murphy Adamson dissent
Justices Rutledge and Murphy joined Black and Douglas1 99 in their "histori-
cal" incorporation argument, but they would not limit 14th Amendment due
process to the "incorporated" Bill of Rights.
"' See, for example, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962), and Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
117 See Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L. J. 74
(1963). For a different view that sees Palko and Black's Adamson formula as the two dom-
inant theories for testing state procedures, see Knowlton, The Supreme Court, Mapp v. Ohio
and Due Process of Law, 49 IOWA L. REv. 14 (1963).
' See supra note 11.
'9justice Douglas has moved to this camp. See supra note 150.
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c) The so-called "Brennan view" of "selective incorporation"
The Court could select certain "specifics" of the first eight Amendments for
"incorporation" into the 14th.
d) The Matthews-Cardozo view (in Hurtado and Palko)
According to the Matthews-Cardozo view the Court recognizes new "funda-
mental rights" as elements of "ordered liberty" from time to time as the com-
munity consciousness accepts their fundamentality.
Each of these alternatives has its shortcomings. The first three suffer from
lack of accepted historical bases. Professor Henkin has recently made a devas-
tating showing that there is no more logic than history in favor of turning to
the first eight Amendments to seek the content of the l4th.200 It is the funda-
mental nature of a right that makes it subject to the 14th Amendment pro-
tection as against the states, and not the fact that it is contained in the first
eight. It is undoubtedly an embarassment to Justice Black's theory that his
omnibus incorporation would strictly entail saddling state practice with civil
jury trials,2 01 and also reverse Hurtado's allowance of indictment by informa-
tion rather than by grand jury. A state's failure to have such grand and petit
jury requirements hardly shocks today's consciences.
The designation "non-rational" applies to the "Brennan view" of "selective
incorporation", which does not have the saving grace of Black's arguable his-
torical contention that the authors of the 14th intended to make the Bill of
Rights applicable against the states and reverse Barron v. Baltimore.2o2
The argument against the Matthews-Cardozo view is that it leaves it within
the discretion of the judges to recognize new "fundamental rights", or to re-
fuse to recognize old ones.20 3 Black's objection to a subjective, free-wheeling
"natural law" is shared by the Institutionalists. For they attend closely to the
2"Henkin, op. cit. supra note 197, at 79. Professor Henkin is certainly correct in saying
that Justice Cardozo's emphasis in Palko was upon locating the right "in the concept of
ordered liberty that is due process," and that any language of "incorporation" is secondary
to this step. It follows, as Henkin indicates, that "A right of counsel, one might say, was
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment, but not necessarily the same right of counsel
given in the fifth [sic] amendment." Ibid. This has been the contention, logically correct, of
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. Professor Henkin is less sure-footed in implying that this
logical position should prevail despite the sociological ineptness of a state-federal double
standard, whether with respect to right to counsel (Gideon), or with respect to trial use of
unconstitutionally seized evidence (Mapp), or as to "cruel and unusual punishment" (Robin-
son). Or perhaps in the future (see supra note 11), with respect to the precise boundaries of
self-incrimination (Twining, Adamson), or of double jeopardy (Palko), or even as to inter-
rogation of defendants (McNabb-Malloiy).
"I' Cf. the 7th Amendment: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
232 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
"'- The answer to the "argument", according to the Institutionalists, is that the judges are
not free in any reasonable, responsible sense of the word. They are bound, from this stand-
point, to make their "choices" within the objectively ascertainable framework of the basic
ideas of the society, as they have developed. The origin of these ideas in American society is
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social facts, the very kind of objective factors that made it so evident that
Betts v. Brady fell well behind the development of the "ideas" of liberty and
equality in the American society of today. The Matthews-Cardozo doctrine
is flexible as well as objective. In fact, upon a showing that present day
standards have advanced beyond the procedures sanctioned in Twining,
Palko, and Adamson, the precise holdings of these cases could be reversed and
still leave intact the general constitutional formulation to which these cases
have lent their names.
What "idea" shared by the national group endorses "incorporation", in
whole or in part? There is the questionable gain of escaping from that min-
imum exercise of judicial judgment that recognizes as "fundamental" and as
part of a "scheme of ordered liberty" 20 4 rights viewed as such by the com-
munity generally. For this is but a sociological report identifying what the
Institutionalists call the developing "ideas" of the group. On the other hand,
"incorporation", even in its most moderate form, is non-rational, it puts the
cart (containment in the first eight Amendments, or any of them) before the
horse (the "fundamental right"). Once evident that the right newly recog-
nized as "fundamental" under the 14th is also contained in the first eight, it
may be treated by the same measure in the 14th as in, say, the 5th. And this
not for logical necessity, but for sociological convenience. Since total "incor-
poration" itself is also without demonstrable historical foundation, its use as
technique connotes a wilfulness and lack of frankness, that belies the professed
canons of realistic jurists.
With so little to gain and so much judicial caste to be lost by a substitution
of the Adamson dissent, or its little brother, "selective incorporation", the
Institutional approach suggests that the assault on the Palko formula should
fail. But creative work remains to be done. What guides are offered here?
VI
THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH: APPLICATION
A. The Argument
Is it the contention of this study that the Supreme Court is reaching the same
results that would follow from the Institutional approach, and under in-
the Preamble of the Constitution: "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, to ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America." This is the starting point from which con-
stitutional development proceeds, both the elaboration of Articles, and subsequent decisional
constitutional law. The Preamble, as we can see, refers us instantly to the life of the society.
204 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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fluence of the same factors, but that the Court camouflages its process with
deceptive "historical" and "analytical" trimmings? Or is it contended that,
despite tipping its hat to formulae, the Court actually proceeds subjectively,
ad hoc, whereas it should adopt an objective method, and most advantageous-
ly the Institutional approach.
Neither alternative gives full sweep to the argument here, which has four
prongs:
1. Often decisions like those reached by the Court would be achieved by
the Institutional approach, and more rationally explained by it.
Thus the right to counsel-from its permissive state in the 6th Amendment
for those who can afford counsel; to its recognition as a right of indigents to
effective representation in capital cases even against state action, (Powell-
1932); to its recognition against states in non-capital cases only where actual
prejudice results from deprivation (Betts-1942); to its absolute recognition
against states, discarding Betts' limitation (Gideon-1963) (to mention only
the mileposts)-is best explained as development, in evolving stages, of con-
stitutional law. And this is the Institutional approach.
2. If the Court were to soften its often too rigid emphasis upon the "fun-
damentality" of the rights to be recognized, and the recent "absorption" lan-
guage, the Hurtado-Twining-Palko formulation would correspond to the ob-
jective Institutional approach to due process.
3. Under the guise of objectivity, the Court has, by use of a pseudo-his-
torical method, and an absolutist reading of constitutional language,205 (as
well as in the proposed "incorporation" formulae), frequently disclosed an
unavowed subjectivity as the real basis of constitutional decisions.
4. The Institutional approach, with its forthright acceptance of the legisla-
tive-political aspect of broad constitutional decision, merits consideration by
the Court in its present reappraisal of due process formulation.
B. The Development
History is thoroughly inadequate to explain Gideon. Incontestably, the lan-
guage of the 6th Amendment itself was not directed towards indigents, but
to those who could pay their way: 206 those who could afford counsel could not
be denied counsel. The very shortage of lawyers in colonial days would have
made compulsory counsel unfeasible. It was not the rule in England. The
I Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark, supra note 6, recalls a recent word of Justice Black:
"I have an idea there are some absolutes. I do not think I am far in that respect from the
Holy Scriptures." To this Griswold comments: "The Black approach might better be called
the 'Fundamentalist theological' approach." Id. at 172.
2 See Justice Clark's treatment of the early history of right to counsel, The Sixth Amend-
ment and the Law of the Land, 8 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1 (1963).
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constitutional issue first descended upon the Supreme Court in Powell, a case
coming out of the Scottsboro trials. The extension of Powell to all cases in the
federal courts (in Johnson) was a severe strain upon the manpower of the
federal bar. When the issue presented itself in Betts the "fair trial" answer
given was hardly avant garde. But it was based upon an arguable position,
that constitutional protection was only needed against de facto prejudice
resulting from the failure to furnish counsel. In the years after Betts the fac-
tual data piled up, almost without exception reinforcing the thinkers who
had protested Betts from the outset. The sheer social need of counsel was un-
derscored by the sorry record of many states in dealing with indigents; this
performance became obvious to the Court itself in processing its petitions and
reading its records on appeal. Type situations piled up that required counsel.
State statutes insuring effective right to assistance of counsel increased in num-
ber-but some laggards remained. Irrationalities accumulated: counsel as-
sured in federal courts and not in state; in capital and not in non-capital
cases; and, above all, to those able to pay in all cases, capital or not, but not to
indigents except as to appeals (since Griffin) but still not at their trial.
These were all objective considerations that coincided with the increasingly
high value placed upon liberty in the shared "ideas" of the polity. No mechan-
ical rule of "incorporation" was necessary to reveal that a "fundamental
right" was being denied, as the unanimous Gideon Court agreed.
With the contentions of the A damson dissenters, developed in the course of
the "debate" on the Court, that judicial free-wheeling is the only alternative
to an "incorporated" rigidity the Institutional approach is in complete dis-
agreement. These jurists distrust, almost as thoroughly as do Justices Black
and Douglas, the pretensions of a "subjective natural law". But they insist
that there is objective soundness in the combination of an intelligent sociolog-
ical appraisal of the "idea" of the society, with careful verification of the
relevant social facts.
The mechanical tests of the Adamson dissent and of "selective incorpora-
tion" are not acceptable to the Institutionalist approach to due process for-
mulation. But neither is the Palko formula in its present form. "A hardship
so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it" may be too strict a
test for delineating a national minimum for rights deserving of constitutional
protection. For rights may be seen from time to time as "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty" without being "fundamental" in the sense that a con-
trary view with respect to giving them 14th Amendment protection would
seem "shocking". Furthermore, every trace of the language of "absorption"
in Palko should be expunged from the Palko formula. Justice Cardozo used
the word in that case with apparent discomfort in referring to the signal de-
velopment since Twining-the cases in which 14th Amendment protection
had been given to speech-press-assembly freedoms that were protected against
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the federal government by the 1st Amendment. Justice Brennan later sought
to draw from this casual use in Palko Cardozo's endorsement of his "selective
incorporation" or "absorption" doctrine. In any event, the legitimate role of
the Court to perceive and to proclaim minimum protection of federal rights
necessary to keep pace with the increasing demand and recognition of in-
dividual liberty should be recognized without the fictitious ritual of an "in-
corporation" formula. Urging such a role for the Court does not entail un-
due expansion of its power, but brings into the open and makes vulnerable
to legitimate public criticism pragmatic, or result-oriented, decisions now
obscured and made invulnerable by a false historical mystique, or by the
mythical certainty of arbitrary judicially contrived formulae, such as "in-
corporation".
The earnestness with which members of the Court are presently engaged in
reexamination, and in search for viable constitutional criteria in the due
process area, is highly promising. Perhaps encouragement may be drawn from
the French Institutionalists. We return to an exposition of their views: first by
way of resume, then of amplification, and finally, in an Epilogue, to make
one special application.
C. Resume
The four institutional themes noted at the outset are recalled here as a frame-
work for review of various points observed in the course of this introductory
study.
1. Law, as purposeful and dynamic, is concerned with developing social
objectives.
This involves discussion of the notions of the "idea" of the social group,
and its development-a fact ascertainable by sociological observation. The
increased valuation of liberty and equality in American society in this cen-
tury is the prime example of the developing "idea".
2. The notion of the significance of social facts in the emergence of
juridical rules.
This emphasizes the social matter or content of judicial rules, rather than
considering them as mere logical intellectual exercise. The social facts them-
selves often demand judicial ratification in the form of a rule. For example,
from the obvious lack of success of the Betts "special circumstance" rule, and
from the growing ratification by the states themselves of the need for counsel,
emerged the new Gideon rule on right to counsel.
3. The law is an art, but subject to scientific conditions.
Under this heading we see the contribution of sociology, politics, econom-
ics, psychology, and other sciences, as well as philosophy, to the jurist. And
yet the object of each of these disciplines is distinct, a point we shall return
[Vol. XIII
Reflections on the Right to Counsel
to in the Epilogue; one aspect will be analyzed there in some detail, the
special object of constitutional law in its broad areas such as "equal protec-
tion" and "due process".
The great role of experience, inductive as it is, is evident here. From ex-
perience we learn that it will not do to deny out of hand a subjective blind
spot in even the ablest judges.2 07 This leads to recommending use of rules
rather than ad hoc judicial judgment when sufficient experience has devel-
oped to found a sound rule. The affirmation of a full-bodied "right to coun-
sel" after years of the Betts "fair trial" formula, and the opposition to the dual
standard (state-federal) formula in the Mapp situation as well, furnish apt
examples here. Experience of centuries affirms the human disability in han-
dling power that leads to establishment of institutional checks, and to rec-
ognition of the social value of power balance that cannot always be struck
effectively a priori, and similarly to finding value (not always necessarily
conclusive) in smallness itself. Yet experience reveals the opposing claims of
bigness in terms of production for human needs. This dualism calls attention
to the fact of constant tensions throughout the social system.
4. Moral presuppositions and values.
Certain common presuppositions are accepted by the Institutionalists as in-
tegral to their analysis: natural sociability of man, existence of a common hu-
man nature (with existence only in concrete individual men), priority of
man over the social group. But the persistent inquiry of the Institutionalists
is into the presently accepted values of the particular group; for these con-
stitute a large element of the "idea" of the society. Achievement of this "idea"
is the object of legislation, and in a certain measure perhaps of constitutional
decision, as well.
The Institutional approach thus insists that there is a reasonably objective
content of law that may be marked out by conscientious and skilful effort.
10 Former Attorney General Biddle in a review of Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfur-
ter-Conflict in the Court, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1042 (1962) underlined some of the author's
statistics:
Of the fifty-nine FLSA cases decided through June 1959, with the exception of four,
"where the issues were simple enough to be settled unanimously, Mr. Justice Black voted
consistently 'prolabor.' " Id. at 1045 ....
From 1938 to 1958 ...more than sixty FELA decisions turned on the sufficiency of the
evidence, and it does not appear (except in one case where the plaintiff in effect repudi-
ated his claim) that Justices Black and Douglas ever voted against a workman (p. 24).
Justices Murphy and Rutledge, who both died in 1949, followed with similar consistency,
as have Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan more recently." Id. at 1046.
Biddle, an old New Deal appointee, concludes with some observations of his own:
The New Deal "activists" read their preferences into the law as much as Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler--only with more consistency. Towards the end of
his career Harlan Stone complained to a friend that, history repeating itself, the Court
was in as much danger as in the old days of becoming a legislative body by "enacting
into law its own predilections." [Citing Mason, SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM 146 (1955)].
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D. Amplification
A short amplification of the Institutional approach as relevant to the con-
stitutional area we have explored would include the following headings:
The Constitution-a written basic law, constant in its main lines, with room for
development within its broad standards (such as due process) as the "ideas" of
the society develop. When such "ideas" as the Federal-state relationships take
new form constitutional interpretation must reflect it.
Judicial self-restraint-In contesting the argument that justice is illusory when
there is no positive limitation upon law-making, Hauriou agreed that logically
a nation-state's "self-limitation" is nonsense, but where it works in practice,
"sociologically it is the living truth." A tradition of self-restraint on the Court in
matters of substantive economic due process that is already a quarter of a century
old, may be "sociologically" more effective in keeping judicial hands off state wel-
fare legislation, than would Justice Black's "incorporation" theory that would
limit due process to the first eight amendments so as to tie the Court down me-
chanically.
State-Federal relationships-Events of the past half-century suggest that there
has been a shifting emphasis in the Federalism. In two areas, it is true, great re-
spect has been shown the states: (1) the Erie rule disavowing the general "diversi-
ty" federal common law, (2) the popular reaction, and belatedly the Court's,2 08
against the substantive economic due process by which the Court had declared
unconstitutional state social legislation. But in most areas this has been an era
of national predominance. The shift has been evident in due process matters af-
fecting liberty and equality. Discernment of the fact stage of this development in
the "idea" of the national society, is a starting point for reasoning in the Institu-
tional approach to a particular problem in evolving due process. Other accepted
objective principles compete for consideration in the context of a particular
problem. To take one example, the guide of human experience as to man's lack
of restraint in handling concentrated power is the root of the constitutional prin-
ciple of separation of powers, both within the structure of the national (or of a
state) government, and in the interrelation of national and state governments
within a federalism. The Court has often been alert to the desirability of leaving
to states what can be done by them. This consideration is still viable in many
areas: two of these were referred to at the outset of this paragraph, a third is in
the administration of criminal law, and was exemplified in the cautious approach
of Betts v. Brady. But when the states have proven unable to handle the task
left to them, the Court more and more has inclined, in areas involving liberties,
to insist upon an explicit national minimum standard. The shifts from Betts to
Gideon, from Wolf to Mapp, from Plessy to Brown, and from Colegrove to Wes-
berry ride comfortably with this analysis. Justice Clark came close to such an ex-
The Court's reaction came late, not until West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) [overruling Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) ]. But cf. Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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planation of the Mapp decision, but backed away from it in the end as "irrele-
vant". Possible future developments in federal constitutional supervision of
criminal law administration that might be explained by this Institutional ap-
proach towards a workable national minimum standard include: an extension of
the McNabb-Mallory rule, and of the federal standards on double jeopardy (cf.
Palko), and on self-incrimination (cf. Twining and Adamson) to guide state
action. And this could be done if and when appropriate without reference to a
ritual of "incorporation".
Institutional balance-The ultimate external control of judicial excesses comes
from the other institutions of society. The balance is not kept perfectly, but his-
tory shows that a headstrong Supreme Court is often followed by a milder one.
The Court may be checked immediately by public opinion (if it has not fol-
lowed Mr. Dooley's election returns), or more slowly by presidential appoint-
ment.
Ultimate ratification of institutional changes-The ultimate criterion of the en-
durance of any major change in institutional relationships or basic rule of law is
public acquiescence. This is obscured with regard to the Court in constitutional
matters because of the relative difficulty of direct constitutional amendment. But,
as noted above, there are indirect ways of resisting unacceptable constitutional
innovation. The chief bar to public reversal of constitutional "legislation" (a
non-pejorative use) is judicial mystique, a masking of the reality of the constitu-
tional process. The Institutional approach is straightforward and frank; it makes




The general claim asserted here is that the French Institutionalists give some
hope to our developing an objective constitutional methodology. A slender
sheaf of their ideas has been measured against the concrete development of
the right to counsel, and the various formulations, past and present, by the
Court of "due process". Is the claim justified in the result? There is an in-
evitable objection that must be faced. It is interesting, you say, to put the
notion of objectivity in the context of ascertaining the "idea" of the society
itself, and accepting that "idea" as the judge's guiding goal. But does this
not merely obscure the subjective value judgment rather than avow it honest-
ly? Did not Gunnar Myrdal revolutionize sociology by admitting that socio-
logical facts cannot be compiled without reflecting values of the compiler?20 9
And is not this supposed objective sociology of the Institutionalists, which is,
See Myrdal, VALUE IN SOCIAL THEORY, 261 (Streeten ed. 1958). See discussion of Myrdal's
views as related to constitutional adjudication in Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality
in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 669 (1960).
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in effect, their compilation of contemporary intellectual history, just as sub.
jective as the evaluation by Mr. Justice Black of more remote history, in
Adamson and in Wesberry, for example? If so, where is the gain?
The Institutionalists answer that (1) unlike justice Black, they ask the
correct question: what are the fundamental ideas of a society today, not what
were they in its origin two centuries ago, or after the Civil War; (2) realists
from Aristotle to Cardozo insist that you can only expect the degree of cer-
tainty that is possible in the matter with which you are dealing.210 Mathemat-
ics and physics furnish subject matter that is more knowable in itself than
are ideas concerning common human objectives, and what is more, we are
more dispassionate ourselves in dealing with the matter of these sciences than
with human affairs. Nevertheless while we must, as Myrdal says (with Aris-
totle), avow and not deny these limitations, we must not renounce compiling
our data with such care as we can. In this sense we are on our way to attaining
the maximum of objectivity that is available. And surely, it is the profession
of the judge to strive for "objectivity" of this sort, and seek to use as his guide
not personal preference (disciplined or undisciplined) but the "idea" of the
society itself to the extent that it is objectively verifiable in this sense.
No society which puts as high a premium as does our own upon individual
liberty of conscience and personal responsibility requires as part of its "idea"
that a judge must enforce an "idea of the state" that violates his own funda-
mental personal values; but it may justly require that he not impose upon
the "institution" his values that it clearly does not share. There is no puzzle
here, but a hard practical choice: translate the objectively verifiable "idea"
into law or resign. If the judge does not see it as it is, so be it. But he is not
then to be held up, in his ineptness, as a model of the wise and upright judge.
Professing these views, the French Institutionalists still share with Justices
Black and Douglas dissatisfaction with the fact that under the Betts v. Brady
rule in each case the Court evaluated the situation anew to ascertain if special
circumstances showed that the indigent defendant had been prejudiced by
the failure of the state to supply counsel. The clear general rule formulated
in advance is one of the foremost assurances of objectivity.21 A Court must
approach generalization cautiously because the succession of individual cases,
and not hearings and debate, furnish it with its surest basis for generalization.
"See, for example, Aristotle, ETHICS, Bk. I, Ch. 1, 1094b, 25: ". . . It is the mark of an
educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the sub-
ject permits."
Then there is his classic warning against impatience or overconfidence in guiding human
affairs:
We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to in-
dicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for
the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no
better. (Id. at 1094b, 20-25.)
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But once the evidence is clear, as it was in the "right to counsel" situation
some time before Gideon appeared, it is time to generalize.
Up to this point there is no shocking departure from previous analyses.
The Institutional approach may, perhaps, tie by a common thread certain
ideas that have been advanced by jurists as disparate as Duguit, Laski,
Holmes, Pound, Cardozo and Frankfurter; but it also rejects significant posi-
tions taken by all of them except Cardozo, with whom it finds its greatest com-
patibility in the common law world. But the most central Institutionalist
note as applied to American constitutional law, to which we now turn, is
beyond the most advanced outpost of the common law jurists named above.
The implications of this central note place the Supreme Court in a frankly
political context with respect to broad areas of constitutional decision; in
summarizing these implications here we return to the question with which
we began: objectivity in constitutional formulation.
This central Institutionalist position stems from the Institutionalists' dis-
tinction between the object of legislation, (the general public interest or
shared common good) and the object of judicial decision, (justice to party
litigants). It might be adapted in this way: the legislative authority in a soci-
ety has the political function of enacting laws calculated to achieve accepted
aims of the society. There is wide choice as to methods to be used, timing,
priorities-but always the object of legislation is the common good, public in-
terest, general welfare, the "idea" that has been accepted by this society. The
legislative inquiry as to the present state of the "idea of the society" is a
sociological one, preliminary to the exercise of its strictly political function
of enacting such laws. In performing its task the legislature calls upon not
only the resources of sociology, but also of economics, psychology and other
sciences to indicate the means best adapted to achieving the accepted goals,
considering the de facto conditions, resources, strengths and weaknesses of
the people living in the society. The legislature may or may not be circum-
scribed by a written constitution or by a supervising judiciary as in our soci-
ety. It is always subject to the effective supervision of some kind of popular
election, and to the directive guideline of the society's common good.
The judicial tribunal in a society has a more circumscribed function. Its
chief object is to achieve justice between the parties that have brought to it
their disputes for adjudication. Such justice connotes decision upon the basis
ml The same distrust of judicial subjectivity often voiced by Justices Black and Douglas (see
text accompanying notes 155-157, 188-189, supra) is shared by classical objective natural law.
It is a fact sometimes lost sight of that both Aristotle and Aquinas distrusted the "animated
justice" of the judge. "It is better", wrote Aristotle, "for all things to be ordered by law than
to be submitted to the will of judges." (RHETORIC, Ch. 1, 1354a, 31). In commenting favorably
on this passage Aquinas suggested three reasons in its support, one of which has special rel-
evance here: that legislators make general provision, and for the future, whereas judges are
affected in their judgment because of the individual situations before them. (SUMMA THE-
OLOGIAE, III, q. 95, a. 1, ad 2.)
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of some preexisting rule of law. But rights of individual litigants find reality
in the total social situation in which they live; there is a social function in
every right of property, for example, that may impose limitations upon its
use. (These limitations may be clearly perceived for the first time in a partic-
ular contested case.) But the basic focus of a traditional judicial decision is
this inter-individual justice, qualified as it may be by special social demands,
and by the general social requirements of order and respect for law.
By common acceptance the legislative function is exercised with prospec-
tive effect, and in the form of general rules. Conversely, the judicial function
is ordinarily exercised in individual cases on the basis of rules conceived to
preexist the decision, either explicitly or implicitly. The earlier theory that
judges merely "discovered" the law already existing came under wide attack
a half century ago and grudgingly it came to be said that judges do "legislate"
but only "interstitially" (Holmes' word, taken up by Cardozo). But "judicial
legislation" continues to have a pejorative sense in the common law world,
as if it were something unclean that "decent" judges should avoid wherever
possible. In public law the Institutionalists shed the traditional common law
prejudice. To them, in many broad areas of the field of constitutional law
the judges do, and should, "legislate", and in no pejorative sense.
In a system where the judiciary is kept in a place subordinate to the legis-
lature, as in England and France, the implications of the traditional analysis
are very much in touch with reality. Conceivably, under our written constitu-
tion a popularly accepted institutional balance might have restricted the
judiciary to deciding cases upon the basis of precedent alone, leaving all cor-
rective change to the legislature. But in fact the American system has not de-
veloped in this way. It has, fortunately, the Institutionalists would certainly
say, recognized a place for judicially effected constitutional change including
frank reversal of earlier decisions. There would be otherwise no alternative
but a constant resort to the tortuous process of constitutional amendment,
since the legislature is not often available here. Basic adherence to precedent,
but willingness to break sharply with it under sufficient provocation is the
de facto story of American constitutional growth. Is the traditional opposition
to judicial legislation unrealistic here?
The Institutionalists would say "Yes". It is the contemporary society with
its presently accepted "ideas", and not colonial or reconstruction society that
is being governed. Even unanimous assent as to the historic setting and intent
of constitutional words does not put an end to inquiry. Constitutional law,
like legislation, must be kept up to date. Conceivably, a method of periodic
constitutional conventions might have been employed, or a frequent use of
the amending process. But could even these theoretic alternatives deal ade-
quately with the broad constitutional categories such as "due process" and
"equal protection"? Is elaboration of these concepts not by design and by in-
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evitable need for suppleness in a constitutional system the task of an institu-
tion constantly in being? Since it cannot be the legislature, as the constitution-
al system has developed, it must be the Court. But is the Court's work here
truly comparable to the ordinary judicial adjudication where ordinary liti-
gants seek justice on the basis of existing rules? Or is it not closer to the mark
to see the Court's prime objective in these cases, as with a legislature, the
public interest, the general welfare, the common good, perhaps embodied in
concrete form by the competing claimants before it? And if so, why profess
that it is carrying out a function that is in the mold of traditional adjudica-
tion? The liberty of this man is significant in the context of the constitutional
case because liberty is a rule for each man in the whole society that looks to
this decision for its rule. The constitutional judge, in this area, then, is a legis-
lator constantly revising and adapting. There is undoubtedly some difference
from legislation: whereas on-again, off-again of a particular law or course of
legislation at successive legislative sessions would be acceptable, in a Court
it would not. But with this obvious qualification, might the Supreme Court
not frankly avow that its decisional development in broad areas committed
to its care is directed towards orderly achievement of currently accepted social
goals? This would permit dispensing with contested historical accounts,
strained analogies, and the fictitious techniques such as "incorporation" or
"absorption", as starting points for judicial reasoning. History, analogy and
technique all have their place in the decision of cases, but not as a camouflage
of the vitality of the constitutional process.
Objectivity is obtainable in constitutional decision, the Institutionalists
would insist. But it is derived by impartial ascertainment by the Court of the
"ideas", including the accepted political, social and moral values of the
society, and by decision in the light of this data. If the Court is mistaken in
its assessment of these values it is subject to correction, self-correction first, but
at any rate correction by other available institutional means (e.g. congression-
al withdrawal of jurisdiction, constitutional amendment, presidential ap-
pointment, and, above all, by public opinion). If the society's values them-
selves are unworthy it is the function of the moral forces in the society-reli-
gious, ethical and social leaders-to strive for their correction. And such
extra-legal and extra-judicial pressures are themselves fundamental to se-
curing acceptance of "good ideas" and achievement of "the good society".
The Court can be blamed if it misreads these "ideas" or ignores the fruit of
these pressures, the Institutionalists would concede, but the Court should not
be expected to take their place.
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